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Article

Lessons Learned: Political Advertising
and Political Law
Kenneth Goldstein,† David A. Schweidel,†† and
Mike Wittenwyler†††
INTRODUCTION
For pundits and politicians, the thirty-second television
spot has become the bogeyman of American elections—blamed
for almost every ill in our political environment, everything
from the cost of running for office, to the influence of lobbyists,
to the inability of legislators to solve long-term policy problems,
to voter apathy.1

† Kenneth Goldstein is President of Kantar Media's Campaign Media
Analysis Group (CMAG). One of the nation’s foremost authorities on political
advertising, Goldstein was a political science professor at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison and the founding director of the University of Wisconsin’s
Advertising Project and News Lab. He has authored or co-authored more than
thirty books, articles, and book chapters on political advertising, voter turnout, and presidential elections and news coverage. In addition to his oversight
of CMAG, he continues to serve as a consultant for the ABC News Elections
Unit. He also regularly provides national news outlets with election and advertising insights, having appeared on ABC World News, CBS Evening News,
NBC Nightly News, CNN, FOX, MSNBC, and CNBC, as well as in The New
York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Post.
†† David A. Schweidel is an assistant professor of marketing at the Wisconsin School of Business at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He received
his Ph.D. in marketing from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania in 2006. He has received both teaching and research awards at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and was identified as a Young Scholar by the
Marketing Science Institute. His research focuses on the development and application of statistical models to understand dynamics in customer behavior.
His recent research examines measurement issues in traditional media and
social media. His work also explores the role of social media as a marketing
research tool.
††† Shareholder, Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison, WI; Adjunct Professor of
Law, University of Wisconsin Law School; B.A. 1995, J.D. 1998, University of
Wisconsin-Madison. Copyright © 2012 by Kenneth Goldstein, David A.
Schweidel, and Mike Wittenwyler.
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The fact that television advertisements garner this significant amount of attention is not necessarily surprising or unwarranted. Television advertisements are the most visible form
of paid political communications and are also the topic of more
than their fair share of media stories.2 Thirty-second spots are
also, by far, the single largest source of campaign expenditures,
comprising between 40 and 50 percent of a campaign’s budget.3
In fact, over the last few years, expenditures on political advertising have reached record-breaking highs, with $2.2 billion
spent in 2006, $2.1 billion spent in 2008, and $2.4 billion spent
in 2010.4 To put these numbers into some more context, in
2010, direct mail garnered $1 billion in spending, radio a little
over $250 million, and the Internet just under $200 million.5
Put another way, in the age of new media, traditional forms of
advertising—television, radio, and snail mail—attracted 18
times more spending than the Internet. In short, “[a] campaign’s ads reveal the success of its fundraising, or lack thereof;
float the messages it believes will win with voters; and shows
who and where those voters are.”6
Much of the attention to television advertising comes from
critics of the way elections are financed, and television advertising is often at the heart of legal and regulatory disputes over
what is permitted in political speech. Political advertising was
the most prominent issue in three of the most important campaign finance cases of the last forty years: Buckley v. Valeo,7
McConnell v. FEC,8 and Citizens United v. FEC.9 And political
1. MICHAEL M. FRANZ ET AL., CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 2–5 (2007).
2. See id. at 1.
3. We rely upon data collected by Kantar Media CMAG, a commercial
firm that tracks political advertising. These data are at the level of the individual ad airing and allow us to know which sponsor, at what time, in which
media market, on which television station, and during which program, each
spot aired. These data are available to scholars through the University of Wisconsin Advertising Project. U. WIS. ADVERTISING PROJECT, http://wiscadproject
.wisc.edu ( last visited Apr. 25, 2012). Full methodological details on coding of
the data are also available on the Wisconsin Advertising Project web site. Id.
4. Kim Geiger, Television Advertising in 2012 Election Could Top $3 Billion, L.A. TIMES POLITICS NOW (Oct. 6, 2011, 2:05 PM), http://www.latimes
.com/news/politics/la-pn-2012-ads-could-top-3-billion-20111006,0,3667624.story.
5. See U. WIS. ADVERTISING PROJECT, supra note 3.
6. Ken Goldstein & Elizabeth Wilner, The Strategy Behind Political Ads,
POLITICO (Jan. 13, 2012, 4:34 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/
71390.html.
7. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) ( per curiam).
8. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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advertising was at the heart of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (known as BCRA or McCain-Feingold).10
These cases not only established new legal standards, they
generated heated debates among politicians, journalists, attorneys, legal scholars, and advocacy groups on the limits of free
speech in competitive elections and the democratic process.
The Citizens United decision in 2010 represented a significant change to the federal campaign finance law and the regulation of political advertising and political speech.11 As such,
the decision has become a lightning rod for criticism by those
who believe it hurt democracy and will lead to the demise of
competitive elections. Critics say it weakens political candidates and parties, hands more power to unaccountable and independent groups, cloaks more political fundraising in a veil of
secrecy, and ultimately favors moneyed interests over the average
voter.12
Our aim in this Article is to explore these claims and to see
if they hold up against the evidence in recent elections. Using a
comprehensive database on the content and targeting of all political advertising aired in federal and state races in the 2002,
2006, and 2010 midterm elections, we examine the nature of
political advertising and look at how the ad wars were fought in
the 2002 election (before implementation of BCRA), in the 2006
election (after implementation of BCRA and the McConnell decision), and the 2010 election (after the Citizens United decision).13
Tad Devine, a senior strategist to Senator John Kerry’s
2004 presidential campaign, once commented that, “advertising
is reality.”14 That is to say, advertising decisions reveal truths
about fundraising, targeting, and messaging. Candidates may
9. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
10. Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–
455, 18 U.S.C. § 607, 36 U.S.C. §§ 510–11, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2006)).
11. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888 (stating that the decision would
overturn portions of McConnell).
12. Elizabeth Kennedy, Citizens United Turns Two: Democracy Is Not a
Game, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
elizabeth-kennedy/citizens-united-turns-two_b_1216013.html; Jesse Lee, President Obama on Citizens United: “Imagine the Power This Will Give Special Interests Over Politicians,” WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July 26, 2010, 3:07 PM), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/07/26/president-obama-citizens-united-imagine
-power-will-give-special-interests-over-polit.
13. See U. WIS. ADVERTISING PROJECT, supra note 3.
14. Interview with Tad Devine, Senior Strategist, John Kerry 2004 Presidential Campaign (Mar. 8, 2012).
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say they want to avoid political advertising, address the issues
on their merits, and engage in long-form debate, but political
advertising is their primary means of communicating with voters. If they are not up on the air, voters are just not going to
know about them. This is why, despite the vocal criticism of political advertising by journalists, campaign finance reformists,
and even ordinary voters,15 political advertising persists as the
primary means of political speech.
Because the lion’s share of political money goes to spot political advertising, understanding its use can tell us much
about the state of American political speech. We examine here
how the composition, targeting, and tone of political advertising
has changed over the last three midterm contests and discover
what the data mean for political competition and political
parties.
In Part I, we describe the critical legal and practical differences between the key campaign finance laws, regulations, and
cases, including BCRA,16 McConnell,17 FEC v. Wisconsin Right
to Life,18 and Citizens United.19
Part II addresses how regulation has affected political parties. We look particularly at whether there are more groupsponsored advertisements and fewer party-sponsored advertisements. This analysis supports the view that political parties
are declining in influence.
In Part III, we examine how the volume and timing of political advertising has changed in response to the new regulations. This analysis contradicts the view that the latest changes
in election law have weakened political speech.
Part IV analyzes the placement and targeting of advertising and how television advertising is reaching an increasingly
wide swath of viewers. This analysis contradicts the view that
political speech is becoming less diverse.
Part V looks at the party affiliation of existing and new advertisers and explores whether the new laws on political advertising favor one party over another. In addition, we look for
signs of undue influence by single groups in the new environ15. See Kennedy, supra note 12; Lee, supra note 12.
16. Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§§ 431–455, 18 U.S.C. § 607, 36 U.S.C. §§ 510–511, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2006)).
17. 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct.
876 (2010).
18. 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
19. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876.
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ment. The evidence so far suggests that the new electionfunding environment gives no unique advantage to any given
party, but certainly advantages outside groups at the expense
of the parties.
Finally, in Part VI, we address how the new regulations affect the diversity of political speech. We look at whether the
new rules have led to more monochromatic political speech or
not.
I. POLITICAL SPEECH AS A WATER BALLOON
While the regulations affecting political speech may
change, one thing remains the same: there will always be money in the political system. It can be said that money acts much
like water in an unbreakable balloon—no matter how much you
squeeze it into one section of the balloon to confine it, water
finds its way to another section. Despite multiple efforts to reduce or limit the amount of money in politics—whether through
new laws, regulations, or lawsuits—money remains in the system and continues to influence the political process. Regardless
of the “reform,” it does not leave.
A. EXPRESS ADVOCACY AND ISSUE ADVOCACY
In Buckley v. Valeo, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
government can regulate only those political communications
that expressly advocate a candidate’s election or defeat.20 That
is, under Buckley, the First Amendment precludes any regulation of political speech that does not “in express terms advocate
the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.”21 In subjecting only “express advocacy” to regulation, the Buckley Court
concluded, in effect, that many forms of political communication would remain wholly unregulated.22
Communication that does not expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate—generally called
issue advocacy—had not, prior to enactment of BCRA and the
holding in McConnell, been subject to any federal campaign finance regulation.23 By definition, issue-advocacy communications avoid any explicit discussion of an identified candidate’s
20. 424 U.S. 1, 79–80 (1976).
21. Id. at 45.
22. In restricting the extent of regulation to express advocacy, the Court
noted that “[f ]unds spent to propagate one’s views on issues without expressly
calling for a candidate’s election or defeat are thus not covered.” Id. at 44.
23. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 126–28 (2003).
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election or defeat and, instead, provide information on an issue
or policy question associated with a public official or candidate—often, though not always, as part of a grassroots lobbying
effort and, sometimes, in the period immediately before an
election.24
Many organizations long have engaged in some form of issue advocacy about issues that affect them and about the positions that candidates take on issues. While, by definition, these
issue-advocacy messages avoid any explicit mention of a candidate’s election or defeat, many of these communications draw
attention to a policy question associated with a public official
and refer directly to a public official—who may or may not be a
candidate—by name. The format and content of an issue advocacy communication are virtually limitless.
In McConnell, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld BCRA’s federal “electioneering communication” standard against a facial
challenge.25 The challenged standard empowered Congress to
regulate certain types of broadcast issue advocacy aimed at
federal elections occurring within a specified number of days of
an election.26 BCRA’s federal electioneering communication
standard did not, however, replace the express advocacy/issue
advocacy distinction; rather, it refined that distinction—but only for federal candidates, only for specified time periods, and
only for broadcast advertising.27 That is, neither the McConnell
decision nor the new federal electioneering communication law
changed this fundamental distinction between express advocacy and issue advocacy. That distinction remains integral to
state and federal law.
In Wisconsin Right to Life—which involved an as-applied
challenge to the same BCRA provisions facially challenged in
McConnell—the Court further narrowed the range of permissible federal regulation of broadcast advocacy.28 The Court

24. See id. at 128.
25. 540 U.S. at 194.
26. BCRA expanded the scope of regulated communication to certain
forms of broadcast (but not print, telephonic, websites, or e-mail) issue advocacy within thirty days of a federal primary election or sixty days of a federal
general election. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(f )(3), 441b (2006). Moreover, the registration and reporting threshold under BCRA for electioneering communications
is $10,000. See id. § 434(f )(1).
27. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 132–34.
28. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
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adopted a narrow definition of “express advocacy”29 and held
that the FEC could not constitutionally prohibit the use of corporate funds to finance issue advocacy advertisements during
pre-federal-election periods.30 After Wisconsin Right to Life,
then, the range of broadcast advocacy subject to federal regulation was limited to express advocacy and any communication
that fit the Court’s extremely narrow conception of “the functional equivalent of express advocacy.”31
B. CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC
In Citizens United, the U.S. Supreme Court held that prohibitions on corporate sponsorship of independent expenditures
are unconstitutional.32 The Court made clear that any attempt
to restrict or limit political speech by any speaker—individuals,
corporations, labor organizations, or tribes—would be highly
disfavored.33 Accordingly, post-Citizens United, federal and
state laws can no longer prohibit organizations from sponsoring
or funding independent expenditures.
The Court’s decision in Citizens United builds on the First
Amendment principles set forth in Wisconsin Right to Life and
reaffirms the government’s inability to restrict or limit spending on issue advocacy at any time, including the time period before an election.34 Just like a campaign finance regulation on
independent expenditures, any electioneering communication
or issue-advocacy regulation must be carefully crafted in a
manner that permits speech regardless of the identity of the
speaker.35
29. Id. at 469–70 (including only communications “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific
candidate”).
30. Id. at 465.
31. Id. at 482, 457.
32. 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). Independent expenditures are express advocacy communications sponsored by a third-party organization such as a political action committee (PAC). As independent communications, they cannot
be coordinated in any way with a candidate or a candidate’s agent. 2 U.S.C.
§ 431 (2006). Under federal campaign finance law and the laws in about half
the states, corporations were prohibited, prior to Citizens United, from sponsoring independent expenditure communications, and are still prohibited from
making campaign contributions. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE
LAWS AFFECTED BY CITIZENS UNITED (2010), available at http://www.ncsl.org/
legislatures-elections/elections-campaigns/citizens-united-and-the-states.aspx#
laws ( last updated Jan. 4, 2011).
33. See 130 S. Ct. at 881–85.
34. See Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 481–82.
35. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
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While Citizens United makes it very difficult for government to prohibit or at all limit the content or source of political
speech, the Court was equally clear that disclaimer and disclosure requirements are permissible.36 The right to speak about
candidates, public officials, and public policy is virtually beyond
regulation, but the public has the right to evaluate that speech
based, in part, on the disclosure of its source.37 However, any
disclosure requirements first must be imposed—if at all—by
state or federal law.38
Citizens United only addressed corporate spending on independent expenditures and not corporate contributions to
candidates and other political committees. In those jurisdictions where direct corporate campaign contributions are prohibited, they will remain prohibited. Citizens United does nothing
to upset those bans and, instead, suggests that such prohibitions will continue to be upheld.39
In the two years since the Supreme Court’s holding in Citizens United, independent political speakers continue to gain
greater freedoms,40 provided that the speech is independent,
but not coordinated.41 Moreover, contribution restrictions have
continued to be upheld, further enhancing the role of independent speakers and spending on their communications.42 While
the U.S. Supreme Court will likely have more opportunities to
revisit these issues,43 independent political speech continues for
now to be the area of political spending toward which money is
being pushed.
36. See id. at 914.
37. See id. at 914 –16.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 901–02, 908 (“[The Court has] sustained limits on direct contributions in order to ensure against the reality or appearance of corruption.”).
40. See, e.g., SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(striking down federal contribution limits as applied to organizations only engaged in independent political speech).
41. See, e.g., Cao v. FEC, 619 F.3d 410, 430–31 (5th Cir. 2010) (upholding
federal contribution limits and coordination restrictions).
42. See, e.g., Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288–90 (D.D.C. 2011)
(upholding prohibition on contributions by foreign nationals), aff ’d mem., 132
S. Ct. 1087 (2012).
43. See, e.g., Wagner v. FEC, No. 11-1841 (JEB), 2012 WL 1255145
(D.D.C. Apr. 16, 2012) (challenging prohibition on federal contractor contributions); United States v. Danielczyk 791 F. Supp. 2d 513, 518 (E.D. Va. 2011)
(motion for reconsideration denied) (striking down federal prohibition on corporate campaign contributions); W. Tradition P’ship v. Attorney General, No.
DA 11-0081, 2011 WL 6888567, at *15 (Mont. Dec. 30, 2011) (upholding Montana’s right to prohibit corporate spending on independent expenditures).
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II. POLITICAL PARTIES AS A DIMINISHING FORCE
The total amount spent on advertising for state and federal
elections was $2.2 billion in 2006, $2.1 billion in 2008, and $2.4
billion in 2010.44 This includes advertisements on national, cable, broadcast, and spot television. It does not include local spot
cable, which accounts for a growing amount of expenditures,
but is still a smaller proportion of overall political advertising
spending—about 15 percent.45
As Figure 1 illustrates, overall spending in federal races in
the 2002, 2006, and 2010 mid-term elections reveals that the
proportion candidates comprise of political advertising has gone
down slightly, from 60% of total campaign advertising spending
in 2002, to 50% in 2006, to about 45% in 2010.46 The proportion
of ad dollars spent by parties in elections has decreased significantly, from about 35% in 2002, to 25% in 2006, to 15% in
2010.47 By contrast, the proportion of ad dollars spent by outside groups has gone up significantly, from about 10% in 2002,
to 25% in 2006, to 50% in 2010.48
Figure 1
Share of Advertising Spending for 2002, 2006, and 2010
Congressional Elections49

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See Geiger, supra note 4.
See id.
See infra Figure 1.
See id.
See id.
U. WIS. ADVERTISING PROJECT, supra note 3.
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Notably, these three midterm elections spanned a period of
significant change in campaign finance law. In 2002, Congress
had passed BCRA, but had not yet implemented it.50 The 2006
elections, by contrast, were subject to BCRA rules.51 And the
2010 elections were governed by the rules laid out in Citizens
United.52
The data in Figure 1 can best be explained by those changes in the law. The political parties lost spending strength during this period because BCRA negatively affected their ability
to raise money.53 The decision in Citizens United, by comparison, strengthened the ability of outside groups to raise and
spend more money.54
This would appear to confirm the criticism that recent
changes in election law have weakened political parties and
strengthened outside groups. It should be noted, however, that
the trend of weakening political parties began before Citizens
United, and party losses in spending power may well have more
to do with the declining confidence major political funders have
in political parties as a means of winning elections.55 It is also
not entirely clear that weakening political parties also results
in diminished political involvement and diversity. In fact, the
ruling has appeared to increase that diversity by making it
harder for political parties to dominate particular forums and
by making it comparatively easier for entities other than traditional political parties to finance advertisements. One of the
core features of the post-Citizens United world is decentralized
50. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155,
§ 402, 116 Stat. 91, 112–13 (making Nov. 6, 2002 BCRA’s earliest effective
date, one day after the U.S. general elections).
51. See id.
52. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 876, 917 (2010) (declaring
unconstitutional certain prohibitions on corporate and union political expenditures, on Jan. 21, 2010, before the 2010 U.S. elections).
53. MICHAEL J. MALBIN, THE ELECTION AFTER REFORM: MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT 60–67 (2006).
54. See R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41054, CAMPAIGN FINANCE AFTER CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION: ISSUES
AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 2 (2010), available at http://fpc.state.gov/
documents/organization/137016.pdf (noting that, after Citizens United, corporations “can fund unlimited express advocacy issue messages” and “appear to be
free to fund electioneering communications from their treasuries at any time”).
55. See The Party’s (Largely) Over, ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 2010, at 71, 71–
72, available at http://www.economist.com/node/17306082 (suggesting that the
decline of a strong party base diminishes political parties’ power to push
through legislation—especially controversial reforms—and award donors
influence).
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management of political speech. This would rebut the criticism
that the Citizens United ruling has reduced the diversity of
voices in the political marketplace. In fact, the ruling has appeared to increase that diversity.
III. THE TIMING OF ADVERTISING
Both BCRA and Citizens United influenced the timing of
advertisement placement, as well as the proportion of expenditures spent on advertising.
Generally, there is always more money spent on advertising at the end of a campaign than at the beginning.56 This is
because most political professionals believe that advertising at
the end of a campaign has a greater effect on voting patterns
than advertising at the beginning of a campaign.57 But with so
much more money spent on advertising by campaigns, parties,
and groups, there is simply not enough television time or inventory to go around over the last two weeks of a campaign.
That means everyone buying television time has to spread out
the advertisements over the course of a campaign. Consider
Figure 2. In 2002, the proportion of advertising expenditures on
television advertising was about 20% during the last week of a
campaign.58 In 2006, the proportion was a little more than 15%
in the last week of a campaign, and by 2010, this proportion
was just over 10%.59

56. See JUDITH S. TRENT ET AL., POLITICAL CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATION:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 352–53 (7th ed. 2011) (explaining that most campaigns begin buying ad time near Election Day and work their way backward
as funds allow, believing that voter exposure will have the greatest impact just
before the election).
57. See id.
58. See infra Figure 2.
59. See id.
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Figure 2
Proportion of Total Advertising Expenditures Over Time60

Despite these common challenges, those who buy television
time exhibit differences in strategies.
As Figure 3 illustrates, candidate spending mirrored the
overall trend of less concentrated spending in the final weeks of
a campaign.61 In 2002, candidates spent about 20% of their advertising budget on television advertising in the last week of
the campaign.62 In 2006, candidates spent about 18%, and by
2010, that proportion was down to about 15%.63

60.
61.
62.
63.

U. WIS. ADVERTISING PROJECT, supra note 3.
See infra Figure 3.
See id.
See id.
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Figure 3
Proportion of Candidate Advertising Over Time64

This decline in candidate expenditures immediately prior
to elections differs from the traditional model. Traditionally,
candidates plan their advertising budget beginning with election day and moving backwards.65 Generally, they create an
advertising budget and allocate a certain amount of money over
the course of the campaign, based on how many advertisements
they want to air at the end of the campaign.66 This strategy allows for an additional concentration of advertisements at the
end of the elections.
Parties are beginning to follow this model of backbudgeting as well. But in contrast to candidate spending, the
proportion of spending by parties on television advertising has
increased since both BCRA and Citizens United. In 2002, parties spent about 20% of their advertising expenditures on television ads in the last week of the campaign.67 In 2006, this proportion was up to 25%, and by 2010, it was almost 30% of their
advertising expenditures.68

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

U. WIS. ADVERTISING PROJECT, supra note 3.
See TRENT ET AL., supra note 56.
See id.
See infra Figure 4.
See id.
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Figure 4
Proportion of Party Advertising Over Time69

Figure 5 shows that interest groups, buoyed by Citizens
United, have followed a different approach. Overall, the proportion of interest group advertising in the very last weeks of a
campaign has actually become less concentrated. In 2002, interest groups spent about 17% of their advertising budget on
television advertisements at the end of a campaign.70 After
BCRA, in 2006, that proportion dropped to about 4%.71 It
picked back up a little bit in 2010, when the proportion of
spending was about 5%.72 In addition, in the last few weeks of
the 2006 and 2008 campaigns, interest group spending was relatively flat, as there was a much more consistent focus.73 By
contrast, in 2002, advertising did not really pick up at all until
the last two or three weeks of a campaign.74

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

U. WIS. ADVERTISING PROJECT, supra note 3.
See infra Figure 5.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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Figure 5
Proportion of Interest Group Advertising Over Time 75

These trends largely stem from interest-group political
strategy. Early on in a campaign, interest groups may try to get
their messages across to as broad an audience as possible. For
example, in the 2010 campaign, groups began researching races
early to determine which ones would be competitive and where
advertising dollars could be most effective in swinging a district
to a favored candidate.76 Later in the race, the groups analyzed
the effect of that early money, and recommitted to higher
amounts in races which had proven to be competitive, while
abandoning those races which had not.77

75. U. WIS. ADVERTISING PROJECT, supra note 3.
76. See, e.g., Michael Luo & Griff Palmer, Outside Groups on the Right
Flexed Muscles in House Races, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at P6 (“In many cases, the Republican-oriented groups got involved in the races early on, battering Democratic candidates with negative advertisements, helping to set the
tone in those districts, even if Democratic candidates and their allies were
eventually able to outspend them.”).
77. See, e.g., Mark Hosenball, Pro-Republican Groups Spend Big on Key
Races, REUTERS, Oct. 27, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
2010/10/27/us-usa-elections-finance-idUSTRE69Q5RV20101027
(reporting
that 2010 Republican senatorial candidate Christine O’Donnell received only
$300,000 from outside, pro-Tea Party groups in the waning weeks of the campaign while her opponent received “no additional support from independent
pro-Democratic groups—a reflection of the assessment that O’Donnell’s consistently poor polling numbers suggest she will probably lose on [Election
Day]”).
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Different interest groups can also share this type of information among themselves. They can then divide up the labor
and decide which group should advertise in which race.78 Such
collaboration would be illegal if the interest groups were coordinating along with the candidates.79 These groups are, however, still allowed to work among themselves.
These data suggest that while Citizens United has
strengthened independent groups, they have deployed this
strength in a way that could actually prove to make elections
more competitive and democracy more vibrant. By devoting
early advertising dollars to relatively unproven candidates, the
outside groups can identify political contests which are surprisingly competitive, and even provide a leg-up to candidates who
would otherwise struggle to gain a voice. This is true both in
the general election and the primary election, where insurgent
candidates are often opposed by political parties.80 So while this
confirms the criticism that Citizens United has strengthened
independent groups at the expense of political parties, it would
appear that this exchange of power has strengthened the political process, based on the access of candidates to early advertising dollars, a critical seedcorn.
IV. ADVERTISEMENT PLACEMENT AND TARGETING
Another trend in television political advertising is that the
ads themselves are much less concentrated among programs
and reach a much broader viewership. Before BCRA and Citizens United, more than 50% of advertising dollars bought time

78. See, e.g., Jim Rutenberg, Pro-Republican Groups Prepare Big Push at
End of Races, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, at A1 (describing how many conservative interest groups worked together in the 2010 campaign by “trading
information through weekly strategy sessions and regular conference
calls . . . [and] divid[ing] up races to avoid duplication . . . and to ensure that
their money is spread around to put Democrats on the defensive in as many
districts and states as possible”).
79. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010) (overturning the
BCRA’s ban on independent expenditures, but noting that “[ b]y definition, an
independent expenditure is political speech presented to the electorate that is
not coordinated with a candidate” (emphasis added)).
80. See SUSAN J. CARROLL, WOMEN AS CANDIDATES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 25 (2d ed. 1994) (“Because victories on the part of insurgent candidates
may further weaken party leaders’ control over future nominations, party
leaders would prefer to avoid such occurrences.”).
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during only the top twenty television programs.81 Now, the top
twenty programs receive only about 25% of the ad buy.82
This trend is the result of two factors. First, ad buyers are
more strategic about how they purchase ads, focusing on programs where they are likely to reach their intended audiences.
Second, with the increase in television advertising, campaigns
and groups can afford to spend on a broader array of programs.
Neither of these explanations supports the criticisms of
Citizens United. The more targeted approach employed by both
major parties reflects a more efficient approach to their advertising budget. Political advertising used to use a carpetbombing approach, with a goal of covering as wide an area as
possible with political messaging.83 Campaigns and buyers are
now shifting to a rifle-shot approach, focused on reaching targeted audiences with specific messages.
The 2004 Bush campaign recognized the value of this approach when research showed Republican-leaning voters were
not watching television shows in the same ratio that all voters
were.84 Republicans decided to spend more on programs
watched by Republicans, aiming to generate enthusiasm for
their candidate and to avoid pouring money into programs that
were viewed largely by Democratic voters.85
This approach, which was employed by the Obama campaign in 2008,86 can spread political speech across a broader
spectrum of the population by reaching niche audiences. Rather
than concentrating political advertising dollars within a few
major networks, the new micro-targeting strategies make more
media relevant to the political process.
There are two countervailing trends here. On the one hand,
the increased micro-targeting of political speech makes it likely
that political speech will only reach certain well-defined and
narrow audiences. This increased targeting, done by both the
Bush campaign in 2004 and the Obama campaign in 2008,
81. See U. WIS. ADVERTISING PROJECT, supra note 3.
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, How to Sell a Candidate to a PorscheDriving, Leno-Loving Nascar Fan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2004, at A18
(“[P]residential campaigns have generally relied on the reach of broadcast television to try to influence the widest possible audience.”).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Jim Rutenberg, Obama Aims TV Ads at Younger Voters, THE
CAUCUS (Oct. 8, 2008, 7:22 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/
08/obama-aims-tv-ads-at-younger-voters/.
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however, is in addition to the more broad targeting of advertising in general. In other words, while there is more rifle-shot
targeting with TV advertising, there is still more shotgun targeting as well. While the trend of micro-targeting and strategic
shift is not a direct outgrowth of Citizens United, it is clear that
its impact is consistent with the overall trend stemming from
the ruling: greater participation and greater fundraising with
fewer centralized controls means political dollars can reach a
variety of audiences. This would support the view that far from
closing out the political process, the post-Citizens United world
appears to be opening it up.
V. SPENDING ADVANTAGES
Some critics of Citizens United, including President Barack
Obama, have argued that one of the primary flaws of the ruling
is the way it permits corporate dollars in the political fundraising process.87 The argument is that those dollars will overwhelm the contributions of ordinary citizens and thereby create
a one-sided political marketplace, with only one side holding
the megaphone.88 With the assumption that corporations overwhelmingly favor Republican candidates, the critics say that
the ruling therefore favors Republicans.89
But the data do not support this claim. Those outside
groups that are getting more-involved in political speech are
not uniform in their ideology, far from it. For example, in 2010,
after Citizens United, the proportion of issue ad spending by
the ten highest sponsors accounted for a smaller fraction of total issue ad spending than in 2002.90
Interestingly, there has been a relative balance between
the overall amount in political spending in the midterm elections, both before and after Citizens United.91 In the top Senate

87. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 12.
88. See, e.g., id.
89. See, e.g., Editorial, The Court’s Blow to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
22, 2010, at A30 (“Now a . . . conservative majority has distorted the political
system to ensure that Republican candidates will be at an enormous advantage in future elections.”).
90. See U. WIS. ADVERTISING PROJECT, supra note 3.
91. Democratic or Republican ad spending includes candidate and party
spending as well as groups airing ads on behalf of the candidates of a particular party. For example, ads aired by American Crossroads would be counted in
the Republican bucket. For a breakdown of interest group spending by party, see
2010 Interest Group Spending Tracker, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost
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races in 2002, the Democrats spent more than Republicans in
New Jersey and North Carolina. Republicans spent more in
Tennessee.92 Aside from these exceptions, both parties spent
about the same amount on television advertising.93
In the 2006 Senate races, the Democrats spent more on advertising than the Republicans in the Maryland and Florida
races.94 Aside from these exceptions, parties spent about the
same amount in the rest of the races.95
In the 2010 Senate races, Democrats outspent Republicans
in Florida, while Republicans outspent Democrats in Connecticut, Wisconsin, and Montana.96 These were the only exceptions.
Combining both the House and Senate races in 2010, the
Democrats actually outspent the Republicans.97 However, Republican groups outspent Democratic groups.98
So while some may argue that Citizens United privileges
one party over another, our data suggest that more interest
group advertising promotes a healthy and fair division between
the parties.
Consider the 2010 midterm elections. Over the summer of
2010, House Republicans had a slight advantage over House
Democrats in advertising spending.99 But as election day approached, Democratic candidates and the Democratic party
were spending much more money on political advertising than
Republicans.100 At the same time, Republican interest groups,
like Crossroads, Seniors Past 60, and American Action Network, became much more active than their Democratic counterparts in these Congressional races.101
The combined effect of these expenditures was to give the
Democrats an overall advantage in spending, but that advantage was fairly slight.102 The relative parity in spending
was largely because of the increased activity of outside groups.
.com/wp-srv/politics/campaign/2010/spending/committee_list.html ( last visited
Apr. 25, 2012).
92. See U. WIS. ADVERTISING PROJECT, supra note 3.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
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While this trend may not hold, the example makes clear that
dollars from outside groups have actually reduced the money
gap between the two major parties and have resulted in an
evening-out in access to political speech.
VI. CONTROL OVER MESSAGES
Critics of Citizens United often say that the ruling will allow major political funders to avoid campaign contribution limits by simply giving unlimited sums to outside groups. These
groups, in turn, will be able to spend liberally to support a given candidate.
This analysis runs counter to yet another criticism of Citizens United—that the ruling weakened control of candidates
over their own election messaging. If outside groups were able
to echo and reinforce a candidate’s messaging, as the critics
say,103 they cannot also undermine candidates’ control over
their messaging. One could be true, but both can’t be.
As it turns out, candidates and political parties have far
less control over political speech in the post-Citizens United
world than they once did. Much to the frustration of campaign
managers, outside groups generally advertise on issues that
candidates are not even discussing.
For example, in the 2002 Senate race, Democratic candidates spent close to $4 million on advertising focused on jobs.104
Issue groups spent just over $1 million on job issues.105
In that same race, Republican candidates spent less than
$1 million on ads focused on taxes.106 Issue groups spent close
to $5 million on advertising about taxes.107 Clearly, the data
show that candidates and issue groups can focus on different
issues, even in the same election.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
See infra Figure 6.
See id.
See infra Figure 7.
See id.
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Figure 6
Democratic Spending by Issue Focus and Sponsor, 2002 Elections108

Figure 7
Republican Spending by Issue Focus and Sponsor, 2002 Elections109

This happens to have clear impacts. While candidates may
prefer to focus on certain campaign themes and tactics, outside
groups—prevented by law from cooperating or coordinating
with specific candidates—may choose other themes and tactics.
Take the 2004 presidential election. In overall spending, the
Democrats spent more than the Republicans. The Kerry campaign, plus the Democratic National Committee, plus
MoveOn.org, and all other Democratic groups combined spent
more than the Bush campaign plus the Republican National
Committee, plus the fairly small number of Republican groups
that were active in that year.110
Yet because the Bush campaign’s funding was primarily
concentrated within the official candidate and party’s apparatus, it was able to deliver a more coordinated and strategic
108. U. WIS. ADVERTISING PROJECT, supra note 3.
109. Id.
110. See id.
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suite of political messages, with a special focus on defining Kerry negatively.
By contrast, the Democratic-leaning outside groups, which
held more money and power than their Republican counterparts, did not follow a coherent approach to their political messages. Most of these groups were focused on attacking the incumbent, which proved to energize Democratic voters but not
win over independents. The Kerry campaign alone sought to
paint a positive picture of their candidate, but those messages
were overwhelmed by the anti-Kerry and even the anti-Bush
messages being placed by other major advertisers. The end result was that the election was defined by the relative popularity of the incumbent President Bush, and not by the appeal of
the challenger, Kerry. The lack of coordination on the Kerry
side ended up undermining the funding advantage it enjoyed.
In this case, the effect—the political victory by the less
well-funded candidate—would tend to support the view that
outside groups’ spending can undermine the power of candidates and political parties. Interest groups may promote advertising that does not reflect a campaign’s messaging priorities.
That is because interest groups exist to reflect the preferences
of their donors, not the candidates themselves. In the postCitizens United environment, an issue or theme has greater potential to be promoted even where a candidate might prefer not
to raise that issue. This would suggest that meaningful political
speech is in fact more open and more accessible than it once
was. While the results may be messy for individual campaigns,
they do auger well for political speech.
CONCLUSIONS
The Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United was rightly seen as a break in campaign finance law and regulation of
political speech. It attempted to resolve some of the most complex issues related to the regulatory treatment of political
speech. Perhaps not surprisingly, critics concluded that the ruling would result in several negative outcomes.
But in the realm of political speech that is most observable
and most impactful—television advertisements—the changes
have not been as those critics had feared. While political parties and candidates have indeed lost power over political speech
due to the rising power of outside funding groups, these groups
have greatly added to the diversity of political speech. The timing and substance of their advertisements have differed from
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the major parties and the candidates, giving the groups a
chance to champion a candidate or an issue which would otherwise be ignored or overlooked. The reach of the advertising of
these outside groups has extended well beyond the traditional
viewership of political ads, drawing in more of the viewing population. And the political loyalties of these outside independent
groups are far from one-sided, and both major political parties
can claim to have significantly well-funded outside groups
pushing in their direction.
These trends are unmistakable based on a review of the
patterns of political television advertising from before and since
Citizens United. While they are subject to change, it is clear
that the fears of the critics have, at least so far, proven unfounded. Whether or not one agrees with the legal reasoning of
Citizens United, the outcome has not been what many quickly
concluded it would be. This proves, yet again, the value of analyzing the way political speech actually expresses itself in each
campaign season.

